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“Civilianization” in Greece versus “Demilitarization” in Turkey

A Comparative Study of Civil-Military Relations and the Impact of the European Union

Özkan Duman

Bilkent University, Turkey

Dimitris Tsarouhas

University of Sheffield, United Kingdom

The civil-military-relations literature has long concentrated on domestic factors in explaining the relationship between civilians and the military. This article concentrates on the effect of an external actor, the European Union (EU), on civil-military relations in Greece and Turkey. The main findings reveal that the two countries shared similar characteristics until the mid-1970s. However, their path of civil-military relations diverged considerably as soon as Greece’s EU membership prospect became tangible. While in the Greek case, “civilianization” took place, Turkey had witnessed a mere “demilitarization” of its regime. However, the article also shows how EU membership paves the way for the improvement of civil-military relations in the Turkish case.

Keywords: *civil-military relations; democratization; EU conditionalities; Greece; Turkey*

The literature on civil-military relations has documented that due to significant differences among regions and countries, developing an overarching theory on the subject is unlikely. Thus, rather than base their arguments on a slippery ground of cross-country and/or comparative analyses, scholars in the field preferred to concentrate on single case studies and to explain developments, solely on the basis of

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endogenous factors. Recently, however, there have been attempts to show the inadequate nature of the classical theories on civil-military relations, such as the ones proposed by Huntington and Janowitz,¹ in explaining the recent course of civil-military relations shaped by the changing security environment, especially after the cold war.² Furthermore, some scholars have argued that the scope of civil-military relations exceeds the boundaries of the sovereign state and the “external factor” is an important variable in explaining civil-military relations in any single country.³ Although the European Union⁴ and NATO appear as the two contemporary examples of this fact, there is much research to be undertaken in this relatively new domain.⁵

Analyzing the role of one of these external actors, the European Union, in (re)shaping civil-military relations toward a liberal-democratic framework constitutes the main focus of this article, the objective of which is twofold: (1) to compare and contrast civil-military relations in Greece and Turkey and (2) to document the effect of EU conditionalities on the improvement of civil-military relations. We will try to explore the EU-induced developments in the sphere of civil-military relations by using a longitudinal analysis for the Greek and Turkish cases. Our main argument is twofold. First, we argue that the development of civil-military relations in the two case studies diverged considerably after 1974; in Greece, “civilianization” has occurred, that is, the devolution of responsibility from the military to the civilian leadership at all levels of government. In the Turkish case, the best description for the observable change is “demilitarization,” that is, a mere diminishing of the military’s role in public decision making.⁶ Second, although this divergence has been triggered mostly by domestic institutional changes, EU membership requirements have been a catalyst to strengthen the domestic equilibrium of forces conducive to a liberal-democratic framework. The case of Turkey, as we will demonstrate, constitutes a further example for the functioning of the EU conditionalities as a “commitment device.”

Before proceeding with the main argument, we will first outline our theoretical framework to highlight the importance of the external factors and then present the context of civil-military relations in Greece and Turkey by briefly outlining the history of military intervention into politics in the two countries. In the final part, we will discuss how EU conditionalities helped the civilianization of civil-military relations in the Greek case and whether Turkey’s EU accession process can lead to a similar outcome.

The Role of External Factors in Explaining Civil-Military Relations

This study aims to benefit from case-study methodology since “case studies are the preferred strategy when ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control over events. And when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context.”⁷ Our case studies are proposed to be explanatory, aimed at making some “analytical generalizations” to expand and generalize particular sets of results to some broader theory.⁸ Second, we prefer multiple-case design to the single-case one since (1) analytic (or cross-case) conclusions independently aris-

ing from two cases will be more powerful than those coming from a single case alone, and (2) the context or domestic conditions of the two cases differ to some extent, and as Yin argued, “if under different circumstances you still can arrive at common conclusions from both cases, they will have immeasurably expanded the generalizability of your findings compared to those from a single case alone.”⁹

In case-study methodology, constructing a preliminary theory related to the topic of study is crucial to determine the questions to be posed as well as the answers to be given to these “why” and “how” questions. Before a researcher puts forward his or her initial theoretical propositions, or “a [hypothetical scenario] about why acts, events, structure and thoughts,”¹⁰ he or she should examine some of the work done as the existing literature may provide a rich theoretical framework for designing a case study.¹¹

The empirical findings in our case studies do not confirm the famous Huntingtonian thesis on the professionalized military and the alleged positive repercussions that such a process has on reducing the military’s interference in civilian affairs.¹² NATO membership for both Greece and Turkey in the 1950s and subsequent professionalization, rather than limiting the military’s political influence, have consolidated the military’s political role and paved the way for the direct takeover of power by the military through coups d’état: in 1967 in Greece and 1960 in Turkey.

Therefore, for the countries analyzed in this study, the external source of improvement is the “EU factor” as it has the potential of acting as a commitment device for civilians to undertake necessary democratic reforms as well as limiting the span of the military’s influence with its “hands-tying” effects on political involvement. Although the degree of influence that the external factor actually plays in assisting the democratization and consolidation processes varies, it will be shown to be, at the very minimum, a revitalizing factor toward establishing a new, democratic set of rules to which both the armed forces and the civilian authorities will feel compelled to comply.

The European Union imposes numerous conditions on the applicant countries that want to join the Union, to avoid any risk of newcomers being politically unstable. By consigning themselves to these conditions, the governments of the applicant countries locate themselves on the “EU accession track” and undertake many reforms to achieve full membership. Although these conditions have always existed in one way or another, they were explicitly spelled out at the Copenhagen European Council (1993) as including a stable democracy, competitive market economy, and a capacity to implement EU laws and policies.¹³

When dealing with the applicant countries, the European Union has used “carrots” rather than “sticks” by granting or withholding rewards but not by punishing noncompliant states.¹⁴ By using conditionalities, the European Union becomes a “focal point” by providing a framework to work toward, by helping to overcome institutional or bureaucratic inertia, and by avoiding a lengthy search for a domestic political consensus in some areas.¹⁵ Furthermore, the European Union provides incentives for rapid change that entrench reforms and can help protect governments in power from opposition pressure and backsliding.¹⁶

The European Union has a variety of techniques at its disposal to fulfill its function as a commitment device.¹⁷ The most effective conditionality tool is access to progres-

sive stages in the accession process or, to put it simply, being promoted from one “waiting room” to another. Benchmarking and monitoring are further effective conditionality devices. The key mechanism for this lever of conditionality is the commission’s “Regular Reports” assessing the candidates’ progress in meeting conditionalities mainly imposed by the “Accession Partnerships.”¹⁸

The theoretical discussion outlined above shows that there is an explicit, causal mechanism linking the EU accession process with a potential improvement in civil-military relations. The European Union has the means to affect civil-military relations in the countries aspiring to join it in two ways: directly and indirectly. First, the European Union may define its own parameters for civil-military relations directly since it “anticipate[s] military cooperation and coordinated civilian control of military activities across national borders.”¹⁹ The European Union can prescribe to the applicant countries harmonized domestic arrangements affecting civil-military relations among all member states “to protect and sustain democratic values in a transnational context” and “to create and enforce international standards of civil-military relations.”²⁰

Second, EU conditionalities imposed on the applicant countries function as a commitment device by enhancing the government’s power base to impose reforms and resist the demands of rent-seeking groups that may wish to oppose any reform proposal that aims to change the status quo. It also creates a stable environment conducive to consensus-seeking compromises among the main political actors to facilitate EU accession, as well as to setting rules that limit the discretion of policy makers and/or align their incentives with long-term policy objectives. That is, the European Union is indirectly contributing to the consolidation of applicant countries’ democracy; in other words, it creates an environment for democratic reforms to be undertaken, functioning as a commitment device, the result of which being that the prerogatives of a politically active military can be curbed to bring it in line with a liberal-democratic framework of civil-military relations.

Therefore, EU conditionalities are most likely to contribute, directly or indirectly, to the improvement of civil-military relations. The hypothesis will be supported below with evidence from the Greek case of democratic consolidation, as well as the liberal-democratic reforms under way in Turkey.

The Greek Military in Politics

Ever since the creation of the modern Greek state, the officer corps were defined by characteristics broadly similar to those found in the rest of society: corruption, nepotism, and clientelistic practices hindered the development of liberal democracy and “spilled over” to the armed forces leading to low levels of organizational readiness.²¹ In 1909 and after, a governmental proposal for the army’s reorganization had met with disapproval; representatives of the army and navy created the Military League and called for a series of economic and political reforms.²² It was the first direct involvement of the military in civilian affairs.

Beginning in 1915, and with the disagreement of Prime Minister Venizelos with the king, a split occurred in the Greek middle class over the future direction of the country.²³ While the prime minister expressed the interests and aspirations of an emerging entrepreneurial class, the throne represented the more traditional, conservative forces. The restoration of the monarchy (abolished in 1923) strengthened the grip of the conservatives and was further assisted by the armed forces. The latter, having been totally purged of their liberal members following an unsuccessful coup attempt by Venizelos sympathizers in 1935, were able to gain absolute control under the auspices of the Metaxas dictatorship in August 1936.²⁴ After World War II, and although parliamentary democracy was restored following the civil war (1946-1949), Greece was effectively ruled by the palace; by a tightly controlled, antileftist parliament; and by the military establishment.²⁵ It was, according to Mouzelis, a “quasi-parliamentary regime” where the military constituted a central pillar of the state apparatus.²⁶ Beginning in 1953, liberalization policies aimed at opening up the Greek economy to foreign capital were implemented. Investment by foreign capital in the Greek market increased at an impressive rate,²⁷ while industrialization accelerated rapidly. “Between 1960 and 1967, the Greek GNP grew at an annual average of 6.7%.”²⁸ This development brought about a substantial increase in living standards for the rural and lower middle classes who were excluded from political life during the postwar era. George Papandreou’s Center Union Party had succeeded in internalizing the calls for further liberalization of the system and posed a challenge to the rules of the game set by the regime.²⁹ When Papandreou’s government of 1963 to 1965 was overthrown, the colonels intervened and tore down the malfunctioning democracy.³⁰

Greece’s entry into NATO in 1952 had important long-term consequences for the military, especially with regard to its levels of operational capability and professionalization. Theoretically at least, NATO membership “served to institutionalize the military’s concentration on national or external defense and away from matters of civil order—a responsibility often accorded to them under authoritarianism.”³¹ A new standing army was created to protect the country from the communist axis.³² Furthermore, U.S. assistance in the form of “sophisticated training and support”³³ strengthened the pro-NATO sentiments within the officer corps and became part of the prevailing ideology within the military establishment.³⁴ As Zaharopoulos put it,

The effect of NATO was to unite the geopolitical interests of the Greek nation with the corporate and professional interests of its armed forces. It is easy to understand, then, why for an overwhelming majority of career officers the NATO alliance [was] the closest thing to a sacred bond, and why anyone who would dare question Greece’s role in it [was] regarded either as a communist or as a fellow-traveller.³⁵

In other words, it was the socioeconomic and political forces operating within the state combined with outside influences that led to the seemingly paradoxical phenomenon of increased military intervention in civilian affairs at a time when the armed forces were acquiring the characteristics of a professional elite. NATO membership, far from consolidating the identification of the armed forces with professional atti-

tudes, reinforced their politicized sentiments and was unable of hindering the breakdown of democracy.

The main provisions of the 1968 constitution revealed the desire of the regime not only to politicize the armed forces but also to grant them complete operational autonomy. Articles 129 to 132 of the 1968 constitution elevated the status of military professionals and gave them complete jurisdiction over civilian affairs.³⁶ The commander of the armed forces, appointed by the government, would now govern the military; once appointed, he could not be dismissed. Law 58 set the boundaries of the commander's jurisdiction. He could reorganize the bureaucracy and day-to-day proceedings of the Supreme Council of National Defense in the way he chose and, under (ill-defined) "special conditions," could take over the administration of one or more parts of the civilian authorities' apparatus.

Further articles of the constitution were deliberately drafted in such a way as to define *national security* very broadly, thus legitimizing the interference of the armed forces in matters of civilian concern.³⁷ This tactic aimed at the intervention of the military into civilian affairs whenever "social and political conditions" deemed it "appropriate" and hence the institutionalization of the regime.³⁸

The Turkish Military in Politics

The military in Turkey has historically played an important role and enjoyed a strong degree of autonomy. Having been a "warrior state,"³⁹ the Ottoman Empire left an explicit military-bureaucratic legacy. The Ottoman state was identified with the military, which played a decisive role in its social, economic, and political organization. For example, the military-led *Young Ottomans* movement gave way to the introduction of constitutional monarchy in 1876, whereas the activities of the *Young Turks* in the conspiratorial Committee of Union and Progress brought the downfall of the absolutist regime of Abdülhamit II in 1908, a process similar to the Military League's intervention in Greece in 1909.⁴⁰ Having these praetorian origins, the military came to be known as the "guardian" of the state, secularism, and the six principles of Kemalism (nationalism, secularism, republicanism, popularism, statism, and reformism).⁴¹ As a result of its "rationalist" understanding of democracy, according to which the military has continuously tried to ensure that the regime functions according to the Kemalist principles and to the best interests of society, there have been four military interventions (1960, 1971, 1980, 1997).⁴² Although these interventions are seen as examples of guardian regimes, where the military "sorts out the mess" in a limited time and returns power to civilians to avoid future "malpractices and deficiencies," the military's political activism hinders the consolidation of democracy.⁴³

The first military intervention in the history of the Republic came just after Turkey's transition to multiparty politics with the establishment of the Democratic Party (DP) and its electoral victory in 1950. The military felt challenged by the DP's populist policy of pleasing the masses by using Islam as a political tool and by the party's authoritarian measures against the opposition and the public. Furthermore, contrary to

Huntington's professionalization thesis and parallel to the Greek case, Turkey's entry into NATO and its subsequent professionalization or modernization facilitated the military's political influence rather than limit it. As a result, on May 27, 1960, the military took power. Similar to their Greek counterparts, officers made their intention clear that they would hand power over to a civilian government once the mess created by the latter was sorted out. After making necessary changes in the institutional configuration, such as setting up a bicameral system with the introduction of the Senate and the National Security Council (NSC) to advise the government on defense and security matters, the military restored power to civilians.

Although the Justice Party (JP)—the DP's successor—won a majority of the votes in the 1965 and 1969 elections, it was unable to cope with the worsening political situation. Partly as a result of the liberal atmosphere of the 1961 Constitution and the 1968 student uprising, extreme groups of the right and left appeared in the political scene. The Enlarged Council of Commanders that met on March 10, 1971, decided to issue a memorandum. In this, the military was essentially complaining about the JP government and threatening to step in unless necessary measures were taken. Following this "halfway coup," martial law was proclaimed, State Security Courts (SSC) were established, and a series of amendments to the Constitution took place in 1971 and 1973 that strengthened the executive and curbed basic freedoms.

The continuing political polarization of Turkish society during the 1970s was of crucial importance for the 1980 intervention. The degree of political violence and the *immobilisme* of the fragile coalition governments and parliament during much of the 1970s were the main reasons for the 1980 intervention.⁴⁴ The Cyprus issue in 1974 also affected civil-military relations: whereas the defeat of the Greek army in Cyprus undermined its credibility and led to the collapse of the junta, the success of the Turkish armed forces and the level of trust people had historically felt toward the military legitimized its subsequent intervention to politics.

The military regime began on September 12, 1980, and lasted until December 6, 1983. To control political violence, the regime amended the Martial Law Act and gave enhanced powers to martial law commanders. A fifteen-member committee prepared the 1982 Constitution, which was a mere reaction to its 1961 predecessor, and centralized power on the premise that the state is supreme over the realm of politics.⁴⁵ The new constitution abolished the Senate, gave the President a seven-year tenure with enhanced powers, and increased the powers of the NSC. Provisional Article 15 of the new constitution provided all NSC members, who exercised legislative and executive power from 1980 to 1983, with immunity. When the Turkish people approved the new constitution by an overwhelming majority (91.37 percent), the leader of the military regime, General Evren, automatically became President, while the other members of the NSC became members of a newly created body, the Presidential Council. The electoral law was also amended to make it more difficult for smaller parties to pass the electoral threshold of 10 percent and enter parliament. Clearly, the preference of the military regime was in a strong government rather than in weak coalitions. Finally, when the military secured some exit guarantees (such as through the NSC, the SSC, the Presidency, and the new constitution), it allowed three political parties located in

the center left and center right of the political spectrum to compete for the general elections of November 6, 1983.⁴⁶

From the mid-1990s onward, the failure of civilian governments to limit the growing influence of Islamism and Kurdish separatism gave the military an opportunity to get increasingly involved in political affairs.⁴⁷ The new international environment created by the end of the cold war and the Gulf War has also allowed the military to expand its sphere of influence in various domains, including foreign policy.⁴⁸

The Welfare Party's (WP) electoral successes in the 1994 local and 1995 parliamentary elections as well as the formation of a coalition government between the Islamist WP and the center-right True Path Party alarmed the military since it was the first time in the Republic's history that an Islamist party received more votes than its secular counterparts. Consequently, the military decided to add the issue of Islamic fundamentalism to the agenda of the NSC meeting scheduled for February 28, 1997.⁴⁹ In this meeting, military officers argued that politicians governing the country were ignoring the principle of secularism and using religion for political purposes. It was also stated that unless the military's recommendations are followed, "a critical threshold" would be crossed. This was a declaration of implicit political involvement. Following this "postmodern" or "soft" coup of February 28, Prime Minister Erbakan, the leader of the WP, resigned. Later, on January 16, 1998, the Constitutional Court dissolved his party on grounds of an incitement of people's religious feelings for political purposes.⁵⁰ In this instance, the military's decision to voice its objections through the NSC without taking power is significant since it reveals a realization of a new set of constraints placed on its role through the EU monitoring process analyzed below.

Civilianization versus Demilitarization of Civil-Military Relations and the Role of the European Union

The Greek Case: Civilianization

Despite the problems that the Greek political system faces from time to time, it is by now widely accepted that democracy in that country is consolidated and secure.⁵¹ The problems that have risen over the past twenty-five years have not been systemic, threatening the prevalence of democratic decision making, but have been related to old practices of personalized politics,⁵² clientelism,⁵³ authoritarian structures of party organization,⁵⁴ and the almost absolute dominance of parties over civil society.⁵⁵

Similar to the Turkish case analyzed below, it is important to emphasize that Greek domestic developments, of which the repercussions after the military defeat in Cyprus are foremost, have paved the way for the increasingly decisive influence of the European Union and the gradual civilianization of Greek civil-military relations. In other words, and while the foundations for successful civilianization were being set as a result of factors outside the Union's competence and jurisdiction, it is by no means certain that Greece would have managed to consolidate democracy; the EU factor, operating mostly indirectly, is the one that made the difference by forcing various

interest groups, not least the military, to comply with stringent membership conditions with regard to their roles in public life.⁵⁶

Three developments have been at the core of the process of transformation in Greece. The first was the split brought about in the Right by the junta. The complete rejection of the colonels' regime by the democratic right-wing forces paved the way for their subsequent smooth integration to the post-1974 democratic regime.⁵⁷ The Right's acceptance of the need for democratic politics was, crucially, shown decisively and swiftly after the fall of the colonels. Prime Minister Karamanlis instigated an Act that legalized all political parties⁵⁸ and removed "the last major piece of civil war discriminatory legislation."⁵⁹ A year later, in 1975, a new democratic constitution was enacted.⁶⁰ Second, a plebiscite called by Karamanlis in December 1974 abolished the monarchy and institutionalized the Hellenic Republic. The monarchy had historically played an active political role; the king's initial endorsement of the junta and his manipulation of political power in the 1960s that blocked the liberalization of the regime led to the endorsement of the Republican constitution by a 70 percent popular majority. Removing this source of antagonism constituted a major step in the direction of a legitimate democratic polity.

The third and, in our view, most important structural change of the post-1974 regime was the civilianization of the political landscape implemented by the armed forces' acceptance of civilian control over political affairs and their exclusive dedication to the protection of the "motherland." For such a transformation to take place, a "focal event" had to occur, and this happened in Cyprus.⁶¹ The junta toppled President Makarios in the summer of 1974 and installed a nationalist leader, Nikolaos Sampson. This prompted the Turkish military to intervene and led to the de facto partition of the island.⁶² The "Cyprus fiasco" stigmatized the army and left it humiliated in the eyes of the public. It is important to underline that the problem of Cyprus has traditionally acquired important political significance in Greece and that politicians of all persuasions have supported the rights of "Cypriot Hellenism" in the island as a vote-maximizing strategy. Any political initiative or outcome seen as damaging to Greek Cypriots would have dire consequences for its instigators. This is the reason that the Cypriot miscalculation backfired so greatly for the colonels and led to their downfall. A few days after the first Turkish intervention, the junta's leaders called for an extraordinary meeting to prepare the transition to a civilian regime.⁶³

Given the almost unanimous perception of a Turkish threat, armed divisions and tanks stationed in the Greater Athens area were ordered by Karamanlis to move north in anticipation of a Turkish invasion.⁶⁴ A general mobilization was called in July, and young Greeks wearing military uniforms contributed to an identification of the army with the people.⁶⁵ Furthermore, and given that elements of the old regime were still holding key positions, Karamanlis placed civilian (Averoff) and military (Ghikas) figures at the head of the key Ministries of Defense and Public Order—figures that enjoyed widespread respect within the armed forces.⁶⁶

Moreover, at a macro level, the 1974 events caused a complete reorganization of the army; the old anticommunist doctrines had proven exaggerated in the face of the "Turkish danger." More important, the universal perception of this threat post-1974

satisfied most of the army's interest-group demands and reconciled it to an apolitical role.⁶⁷ Financially, the constant tension with Turkey ever since 1974 has resulted in very high defense expenditure.⁶⁸ Politically, the 1981 election victory of the Socialist Party (PASOK) posed potential problems in terms of the army's acceptance of a left-wing prime minister. Nevertheless, Prime Minister Papandreou's nationalistic rhetoric,⁶⁹ the continued high expenditure for army equipment, and his signing of the 1983 agreement with the United States for further stationing its bases in Greece paved the way for harmonious relations. Finally, by 1974, it has been estimated that about three quarters of the officers purged in 1967 had retaken their positions.⁷⁰ For army professionals, this was a clear indication that the new civilian government wished the restoration of cooperative relations.

While these factors are important in their own right, there are political and economic arguments, which point to a causal relationship between the consolidation of Greek democracy and the European Union. To start with, the European Union played a significant role in undermining the credibility and international status of the colonels' regime by freezing the 1962 Association Agreement.⁷¹ With reference to the increasing dependency of Greek products on European markets, it is assumed that this isolation forced the regime to embark on liberalization policies that led to its ultimate collapse.⁷² On a more practical level, the European Union's stringent rules on democratic government acted as a powerful motivation for Prime Minister Karamanlis to expedite the elections in November 1974.⁷³ More generally, EU membership set it as a direct precondition that civil law would dominate the military's wishes.⁷⁴ At a time when future civil-military relations were a matter of serious concern for the new political leadership, EU democratic conditionalities increased the popular appeal of the Union to embed democracy and subjugate the army to a new operational environment. Moreover, the new government's desire to subjugate the army to civilian control was, on its own, too fragile to allow for such a development. The European Union's calling for sweeping democratization in civil society and the armed forces as a precondition for membership strengthened the hand of Karamanlis in the crucial years after 1974. "The fact the [European Union] had differentiated its attitude towards the military government from that of the US, together with its insistence that membership was open only to states with democratically elected governments led both the Right . . . and the Centre to regard accession as the best safeguard for Greece's fledgling democratic institutions."⁷⁵

EU membership was therefore a safety valve for the irreversibility of democratic practices.⁷⁶ The new democratic elite used the EU factor shrewdly to establish a hierarchical pattern of decision making whereby the armed forces would be subordinate to civilian leadership. The Turkish threat consolidated the belief shared by many in the country's political and economic elites that EU membership and subsequent inclusion in "multifaceted European networks" guaranteed peace and prosperity.⁷⁷ The military, faced with a new set of circumstances resulting from the popular government's repeated calls for EU entry and its own reduced credibility, duly obliged. Furthermore, the "Europeanization of political perspectives" allowed Greek politicians, civil servants and officials to internalize the norms and procedures of a democratically struc-

tered polity and transmit them to the wider public.⁷⁸ Once all-important political players had grown familiar with liberal-democratic lines of reasoning,⁷⁹ the degree of uncertainty over the eventual outcome of decisions would diminish; once this process was complete, democratic consolidation could be described as a completed process.⁸⁰

Also important is the argument emphasizing the effect of the European Union's financial help to the Greek economy. The Union funds earmarked for Greece both before the accession and after 1981 helped create a clear linkage between Europe, democracy, and economic prosperity, reducing economic disparities and creating pockets of economic growth in erstwhile underdeveloped regions.⁸¹ As the economic situation improved due to EU assistance, the benefits of EU participation became increasingly obvious even to erstwhile opponents of membership. EU-led economic growth did not necessitate reductions in the budget of the armed forces under the Socialist government, as outlined above, and facilitated the imposition of civilian control by Prime Minister Papandreou over an initially distrustful military. Therefore, economic flexibility has been crucial in consolidating the armed forces' subjugation to the government. Conflict-ridden civil-military relations are usually found in economically weak states, and the European Union's contribution to the structural transformation of the character of the Greek economy reduced the army's uncertainty about its economic standing in an EU-inspired, liberal-democratic framework.⁸²

The Turkish Case: Demilitarization

In the case of Turkey, there have been mainly three channels for the military's political influence, through which the armed forces have exerted political power. The first is the NSC, which was established by the 1961 Constitution and is mainly composed of the President, Prime Minister, ministers related with national security issues, and four force commanders. The scope and the effectiveness of the NSC were increased with the constitutional amendments of 1973 and with the 1980 Constitution. Until quite recently, this mixed body of unelected officials and politicians stood as the de facto ruling body. The governments of all time were supposed to give priority consideration to the decisions taken in the NSC meetings.⁸³

The second channel of influence was the office of the President of the Republic. There emerged a de facto tradition that Turkish presidents either were former heads of the general staff or had a military background. Especially after the 1982 Constitution, as a result of which the executive powers of the Presidency were strengthened, the institution of the presidency gained in status and importance.

Third, by using certain practices and its presence in some institutions, the military is said to have further consolidated its political role. The presence of military judges in the SSC, which deal with overtly political crimes, and the practice of "state of emergency," which was designed for southeast Turkey to counter terrorist activities of the so-called Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), were given as typical examples of such an influence.

Although the military justified its political dominance through its role as the "guardian of the national interest," the Turkish army "eschewed the idea of long term

military rule.”⁸⁴ The military tried to find an appropriate formula to enhance democracy, although their understanding of democracy was rationalist and circumscribed.⁸⁵ After each military intervention, the Turkish military wanted to hand power back to civilians as soon as possible.⁸⁶ However, by looking at the channels of the military’s political influence quoted above, it is possible to claim that restorations of civil-military relations after each breakdown are of a demilitarization rather than a civilianization kind. Rather than transfer governing responsibility to civilians at all levels of government, the military simply withdrew from open public decision making with some exit guarantees, which allowed it to operate behind the scenes. Especially after the 1980 intervention, the military institutionalized its political influence through the NSC, the SSC, and the presidency.⁸⁷

The European Union has explicitly addressed these deficiencies in Turkish civil-military relations through official documentation. In the Accession Partnership Document, presented to Turkey on November 8, 2000, and in the annual Regular Reports issued by the European Commission, the main reference point for the political criteria was human rights and democratization. The European Union has recommended that Turkey, among others, reduce the role of the NSC to an advisory one, change the composition of the SSC, and abolish the state of emergency in the southeast. For example, the 1998 Regular Report explicitly stated that

the existence of [the NSC] shows that, despite a basic democratic structure, the Turkish constitution allows the army to play a civil role and to intervene in every area of political life. . . . The army is not subject to civil control and sometimes even appears to act without [the] government’s knowledge when it carries out certain large-scale repressive military operations.⁸⁸

Recently, however, it appears that Turkey may be moving toward a civilianized liberal-democratic type of civil-military relations. The 1990s led to the intensification of EU-Turkish relations, and the decision of the 1999 Helsinki Summit to offer Turkey the status of a candidate country can be seen as the start of a gradual process leading to the eventual civilianization of civil-military relations. “In the post-Helsinki period, the pre-accession mechanisms have made Turkey more positively inclined to the EU’s requirements and have justified the EU’s interventions into Turkey’s domestic politics.”⁸⁹

As far as the NSC is concerned, Article 118 of the 1982 constitution was stating that “the Council of Ministers shall give *priority consideration* to the decisions of the National Security Council [emphasis added]” concerning state security–related subjects. The vague and slippery concept of national security in the Turkish context, similar to the one employed by the 1967 regime in Greece, was said to increase the room for the military’s political maneuvering. Furthermore, the Constitution’s wording was perceived as more “commanding” than “recommending” by the European Union.⁹⁰ With the “first harmonization package” of October 2001, including thirty-four constitutional amendments, Article 118 was changed so that the Council of Ministers shall *evaluate* instead of give *priority consideration* to the decisions of the NSC. Further-

more, the number of civilian members in the NSC increased from five to nine. At the time of writing this article, with the seventh harmonization package, the frequency of NSC meetings decreased from once every month to once every second month. Moreover, in August 2004, the first civilian rather than military general, Mehmet Yiğit Alpogan—a career diplomat who served as Turkish ambassador to Greece—was appointed to lead the NSC.⁹¹

The European Union's demands for a reduced military role brought more direct improvements in civil-military relations. As described above, the system of the SSC was another point of criticism by the European Union. Just before the trial of Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK, the composition of the SSC was changed, and a judge from a civilian background was appointed for his case. Later, the functioning powers and responsibilities of the SSC were revised extensively through harmonization packages. Following EU-stemming pressures, the state of emergency was also gradually lifted until the Copenhagen Summit of December 2002. When it comes to the presidency, ever since Özal was elected to this post, the *de facto* tradition of military generals moving to the presidency is over. Demirel and Sezer have succeeded Özal without any problems.

The EU-induced improvements in civil-military relations had further positive side effects. To illustrate, although Turkey had exercised a *de facto* moratorium on the death penalty since the early 1980s, the military was hesitant in abolishing it altogether, fearing that such a move may boost terrorism. Furthermore, following the same logic, the military was not willing to allow the usage of Kurdish in broadcasting and education. In harmonization packages, the death penalty was first restricted to cases of terrorist crime and to times of war or imminent threat of war, and then, it was abolished altogether. Broadcasting and educating in the Kurdish language were allowed with the amendments brought, again, by harmonization packages.

Furthermore, with the liberal environment created by the EU accession process and constitutional amendments, some taboo subjects started being discussed openly. For example, the leader of Motherland Party, Mesut Yılmaz, indirectly accused the military of behaving obsessively in their exhaustive understanding of "national security." Yılmaz claimed that this behavior is an obstacle for the consolidation of democracy in Turkey.⁹² However, the military, like in most cases, confirmed that it was principally unopposed to the EU accession process but had some objections to the "concessions" (like the Cyprus issue, Kurdish language, and death penalty) that are likely to be made on the way to the European Union.⁹³

Finally, the military and the Justice and Development Party (JDP) that came to power after the November 2002 elections are cooperating fairly smoothly. Despite the JDP's pro-Islamic background, the military never questioned its legitimacy to rule and criticized heavily the rumors of another military intervention by saying that such events would hinder democracy in Turkey and should be avoided.⁹⁴

In sum, the EU carrot offered to Turkey raised the hopes for creating an externally induced system to consolidate democracy since Turkey is now seeking membership in a group of states where the armed forces are controlled by civilian forces in line with

the liberal-democratic model. As Cizre argued, “The EU pressure seemed the only visible factor that might lead to a smaller role for the military in Turkish politics.”⁹⁵

Conclusion

Civil-military relations in Greece and Turkey have followed a broadly similar trajectory until the 1970s. Following a legacy of praetorian military behavior, democracy in both cases had been subject to the “exhaustive” national security definitions employed by the military, which tried to institutionalize its political influence through measures like the NSC and the “security-oriented,” constitution-making processes.

However, as a result of a complex interplay of contextual and international factors, Greek civil-military relations came to be civilianized, whereas in the Turkish case, the era of cyclical demilitarization came to an end. In the Greek case, the focal event facilitating the European Union’s role as an external anchor was the 1974 Cyprus crisis that led to the collapse of the colonels’ junta and the discrediting of the armed forces. The Turkish threat that Greece lived under in the summer of 1974, in combination with insightful political and institutional maneuvering by the political leadership, led to the gradual civilianization of the regime that was confirmed after the Socialist election victory in the 1980s. For all the domestic changes initiated after 1974, however, the European Union proved to be the catalyst in “locking in” the democratization of the civil polity by providing clear political incentives for the removal of the military from political life. While such a process was initiated by the new leadership, the carrots associated with EU membership meant that the reduction in the military’s influence enabled the realization of the new elite’s democratic aspirations.

In the Turkish case, especially after a series of favorable domestic changes took place, the EU conditionalities fostered the democratic reforms that led to the civilianization of civil-military relations and closed the era of cyclical demilitarization. In the accession process, the European Union is requesting the curbing of the military’s political prerogatives as outlined in the Regular Reports and Accession Partnerships. Furthermore, the democratic reforms undertaken as part of this process and the gradual consolidation of Turkish democracy create a favorable environment for a drastic improvement in civil-military relations. Recent changes, such as the constitutional amendments and legal reforms undertaken as part of EU harmonization packages, the reorganization of the NSC, the abolishment of the SSC, and the lifting of the state of emergency, illustrate this development.

To conclude, both of our case studies verify the hypothesis of a strong positive correlation between improved civil-military relations and the European Union as an external actor. Indeed, it is possible to generalize the results of this study to the broader theory outlined at the beginning and claim that the EU conditionalities, if taking place in the context of a favorable domestic setting where the maturation of institutional decision making is pointing to a change conducive to the emergence of a liberal-democratic regime, can accelerate and, crucially, enable the smooth transition to such a regime.

Notes

1. Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1957); and Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier* (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1960).
2. For a review of some critical studies on this field, see James Burk, "Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relations," *Armed Forces & Society* 29, no. 1 (Fall 2002): 7-29. Representative examples of such accounts include Michael Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999); and Charles Moskos, John Allen Williams, and David Segal, eds., *The Post Modern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2000).
3. For the positive effect of NATO membership on civil-military relations in Central and Eastern Europe, see Anthony Forster, Timothy Edmunds, and Andrew Cottey, eds., *The Challenge of Military Reform in Postcommunist Europe: Building Professional Armed Forces* (Hampshire, UK: Palgrave, 2002).
4. The European Union was, until 1993, also known as the European Community (EC). To avoid confusion, we will use the term *European Union* throughout the article.
5. Burk, "Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relations," 20.
6. For the basic theoretical distinction between "civilianization" and "demilitarization," see Ahmet Evin, "Demilitarization and Civilianization of the Regime," in *Politics in the Third Turkish Republic*, ed. Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1994), 23-40.
7. Robert K. Yin, *Case Study Research: Designs and Methods* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2003), 1.
8. *Ibid.*, 37.
9. *Ibid.*, 53.
10. R. I. Sutton and B. M. Staw, "What a Theory Is Not," *Administrative Science Quarterly* 40 (1995): 378.
11. Yin, *Case Study Research*, 29.
12. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*.
13. An outline of the Copenhagen Criteria as well as the so-called Madrid Criteria for EU membership is obtainable at the Web site of the European Commission, Directorate General for Enlargement, <http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/intro/criteria.htm>.
14. For the "carrots" and "sticks" argument, see Heather Grabbe, "EU Conditionality and the Acquis Communautaire," *International Political Science Review* 23, no. 3 (July, 2002): 249-68. For the "reactive-reinforcement" argument, see Frank Schimmelfenning, Stefan Engert, and Heiko Knobel, "Costs, Commitment and Compliance: The Impact of EU Democratic Conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia and Turkey," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 41, no. 3 (2003): 495-518.
15. This has been especially apparent in the Greek case where a consensus over EU membership, let alone the policy guidelines that the country should follow post-1974, had been absent for a long time.
16. Grabbe, "EU Conditionality," 260.
17. The European Union's conditionality tools can be summarized as (1) *gate-keeping* (access to negotiations and further stages in the accession process), (2) *models* (provision of legislative and institutional templates), (3) *financial clout* (aid and technical assistance), (4) *advice and twinning*, and (5) *benchmarking and monitoring*. See Grabbe, "EU Conditionality"; and Heather Grabbe, "How Does Europeanization Affect CEE Governance? Conditionality, Diffusion and Diversity," *Journal of European Public Policy* 8, no. 6 (December 2001): 1013-31.
18. The European Union introduced "Accession Partnerships" in 1998. This document lists the policy priorities that have to be implemented either in the short term (defined as one year) or medium term (defined as five years). "Accession Partnerships" can be found at <http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/pas/aps.htm#npaa> and "Regular Reports" at http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_11_98/index.htm#report.
19. Burk, "Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relations," 20.
20. *Ibid.*, 20-21. Some examples dealing with the European Union's efforts to protect and sustain democratic civil-military relations are Michael C. Williams, "The Discipline of the Democratic Peace," *European Journal of International Relations* 7 (2001): 525-53; and Ümit Cizre, "Problems of Democratic Governance

of Civil-Military Relations in Turkey and the European Union Enlargement Zone," *European Journal of Political Research* 43, no. 1 (January 2004): 107-25.

21. S. V. Papakosma, *The Military in Greek Politics: The 1909 Coup D'Etat* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1977), 37. This relationship of patronage and mutual distrust continued in the twentieth century. See George Zaharopoulos, "Politics and the Army in Post-war Greece," in *Greece under Military Rule*, ed. Richard Clogg and George Yannopoulos (London: Secker and Warburg, 1972).

22. Papakosma, *The Military in Greek Politics*, 65.

23. Nikiforos P. Diamantouros, "Prospects for Democracy in Greece: 1974-1983," in *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*, ed. Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 140.

24. *Ibid.*, 142.

25. Constantine P. Danopoulos, "Democratizing the Military: Lessons from Mediterranean Europe," *West European Politics* 14, no. 4 (October 1991): 25-41.

26. Nikos Mouzelis cited in Susannah Verney and Theodore Couloumbis, "State-International Systems Interaction and the Greek Transition to Democracy in the Mid-1970s," in *Encouraging Democracy: The International Context of Regime Transition in Southern Europe*, ed. Geoffrey Pridham (Leicester, UK: Leicester University Press, 1991), 105.

27. Postwar Greece, in need of economic development that would keep radical political forces away from politics, opted for a full integration to the international market. Diamantouros, "Regime Change and the Prospects for Democracy in Greece: 1974-1983," in *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*, 144.

28. Nikos Poulantzas, *The Crisis of the Dictatorships* (Thetford, UK: Lowe and Brydone Printers, 1976), 17.

29. Danopoulos, "Democratizing the Military," 32.

30. Zaharopoulos, "Politics and the Army in Post-war Greece," 28.

31. Geoffrey Pridham, "The International Context of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective," in *The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective*, ed. R. Gunther, N. P. Diamantouros, and H.-J. Puhle (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 197. Professionalization is also regarded to be in tandem with a realization by the officer corps that they are distinguished from the rest of society on grounds of their values, attitudes, and mode of thinking. See Richard A. Ball and Guy B. Peters, *Modern Politics and Governments* (Basingstoke, UK: Mcmillan, 2000), 267.

32. Zaharopoulos, "Politics and the Army in Post-war Greece," 22.

33. Danopoulos, "Democratizing the Military," 30.

34. Pridham, "International Context," 190.

35. Zaharopoulos, "Politics and the Army in Post-war Greece," 22.

36. The following part has been largely based on Constantine P. Danopoulos, "Military Professionalism and Regime Legitimacy in Greece, 1967-1974," *Political Science Quarterly* 98, no. 3 (Fall 1983): 485-506.

37. The colonels organized a (rigged) plebiscite for the approval of the constitution that approved its drafts by 91.87 percent. Specific articles of the constitution curbed the powers of the monarch and provided for the eventual restoration of multiparty democracy albeit under "state control." See Stephen G. Xydis, "Coups and Countercoups in Greece, 1967-1973," *Political Science Quarterly* 89, no. 3 (Autumn 1974): 507-38.

38. Diamantouros, "Prospects for Democracy in Greece," 151.

39. Halil İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300-1600* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973), 65-69.

40. Both the Young Ottomans and Young Turks movements were composed of military and civil-bureaucratic elites, whose main aim was to save the (Ottoman) state from eventual disintegration. Furthermore, their composition, strategies, and aims are similar to the Military League in Greece.

41. Nilüfer Narlı, "Civil-Military Relations in Turkey," *Turkish Studies* 1, no. 1 (Spring 2000): 108.

42. Metin Heper, "The 'Strong State' and Democracy: Turkey in Comparative and Historical Perspective," in *Democracy and Modernity*, ed. S. N. Eisenstadt (Leiden, the Netherlands: Brill, 1992), 142-69.

43. For a typology of military regimes, see Eric A. Nordlinger, *Soldier in Politics: Military Coups and Governments* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1977).

44. Political terror around this period was organized along ideological, sectarian, and ethnic lines. Between 1975 and 1980, more than five thousand people died and three times as many were wounded.
45. William Hale, *Turkish Politics and Military* (London: Routledge, 1994), 256.
46. These parties were the Nationalist Democracy Party, the Populist Party (whose leaders were hand-picked by the military), and the Motherland Party of Turgut Özal.
47. Ümit Cizre Sakallioğlu, "The Military and Politics: A Turkish Dilemma," in *Armed Forces in the Middle East: Politics and Strategy*, ed. Barry Rubin and Thomas A. Keaney (London: Frank Cass, 2002), 195.
48. Gencer Özcan and Ofra Bengio, "The Decade of the Military in Turkey: The Case of the Alignment with Israel in the 1990s," *International Journal of Turkish Studies* 7, no. 1-2 (Spring 2001): 93.
49. The main points of concern for the military were the amount of capital owned by Islamic companies, the religious education given in the Prayer Leader and Preacher Schools, and Koran Courses.
50. On January 16, 1998, the European Court of Human Rights also decided in favor of the closure of the party by stating that the Welfare Party supported political aims that were inconsistent with the rules of democracy.
51. Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 138; Nikos Alivizatos and Panos Eleftheriadis, "The Greek Constitutional Amendment of 2001," *South European Society and Politics* 7, no. 1 (Summer 2002): 63-71; and Kevin Featherstone, "The Challenge of Liberalization: Parties and the State in Greece after the 1993 Elections," *Democratization* 1, no. 2 (Summer 1994): 280-94.
52. Jose M. Magone, "Party Factionalism in New Small Southern European Democracies: Some Comparative Findings from the Portuguese and Greek Experiences (1974-82)," *Democratization* 2, no. 1 (Spring 1995): 90-101.
53. Vassilis Fouskas, "The Muffled Voice of the New PASOK: Reflections on Neo-revisionist Socialism in Greece," *South European Society and Politics* 3, no. 1 (Summer 1998): 130-41.
54. Diamantouros, "Prospects for Democracy in Greece," 196.
55. *Ibid.*, 196; Vicky Randall and Lars Svåsand, "Introduction: The Contribution of Parties to Democracy and Democratic Consolidation," *Democratization* 9, no. 3 (Autumn 2002): 1-10.
56. Kosta Messas, "Greece," in *The Political Role of the Military*, ed. Constantine P. Danopoulos and Cynthia Watson (London: Greenwood, 1996), 166.
57. N. P. Diamantouros, "The Political System in Postauthoritarian Greece," in *The Organization of Political Parties in Southern Europe*, ed. Piero Ignazi and Colette Ysmal (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998), 191; and Vassilios Tsingos, "Underwriting Democracy: The European Community and Greece," in *The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas*, ed. Laurence Whitehead (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1996), 325.
58. Ever since 1948 the Communist Party (KKE) was banned from any political activity.
59. Diamantouros cited in Kevin Featherstone, "Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Greece," in *Securing Democracy: Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe*, ed. Geoffrey Pridham (London and New York: Routledge, 1990), 184.
60. Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, 133.
61. Andreas Schedler, "Taking Uncertainty Seriously: The Blurred Boundaries of Democratic Transition and Consolidation," *Democratization* 8, no. 4 (2001): 12.
62. Diamantouros, "The Political System in Postauthoritarian Greece," 191.
63. Messas, "Greece," 162.
64. Tsingos, "Underwriting Democracy," 331.
65. *Ibid.*, 330.
66. Nikiforos P. Diamantouros, "Transition to and Consolidation of Democratic Politics in Greece, 1974-1983: A Tentative Assessment," *West European Politics* 7, no. 2 (April 1984): 50-71.
67. Civilian rule was last threatened by an unsuccessful military coup in February 1975.
68. Verney and Coulombis, "State-International Systems," 118.
69. Pridham, "International Context," 190.
70. Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, 132.

71. Verney and Coulombis, "State-International Systems," 109.
72. Tsingos, "Underwriting Democracy," 318. By 1973, prominent Greek politicians, such as Karamanlis, as well as figures like the former governor of the Bank of Greece Zolotas, were publicly calling for a restoration of democracy to allow for EU membership.
73. However, there is an argument claiming that holding swift elections gave no time to his political opponents to organize and present a credible alternative. See Diamantouros, "The Political System in Postauthoritarian Greece."
74. Susannah Verney, "To Be or Not to Be within the European Community: The Party Debate and Democratic Consolidation in Greece," in *Securing Democracy: Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe*, ed. Geoffrey Pridham (London: Routledge, 1990), 207.
75. Susannah Verney, "Greece and the European Community," in *Political Change in Greece: Before and after the Colonels*, ed. Kevin Featherstone and Dimitrios K. Katsoulis (London: Croom Helm, 1987), 259.
76. Verney, "To Be or Not to Be," 208.
77. Felipe Agüero, *Soldiers, Civilians and Democracies* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 33.
78. Pridham, "International Context," 171.
79. Initial opposition to EU membership from the socialist PASOK and the Communist Party was very strong. Gradually, however, both parties accepted the new rules of the game. See Susannah Verney, "To Be or Not to Be."
80. Schedler, "Taking Uncertainty Seriously," 12; and Pridham, "International Context," 168. It is worth bearing in mind, however, that a universally applicable definition of democratic consolidation does not exist and that distinguishing between the transition and the consolidation phases is a formidable task. See Schedler, "Taking Uncertainty Seriously," 7.
81. Tsingos, "Underwriting Democracy," 341.
82. Agüero, *Soldiers, Civilians and Democracies*, 34.
83. Ümit Cizre Sakallioğlu, "The Anatomy of Turkish Military's Political Autonomy," *Comparative Politics* 29, no. 2 (1997): 157-58.
84. Tanel Demirel, "The Turkish Military's Decision to Intervene: 12 September 1980," *Armed Forces & Society* 29, no. 2 (Winter 2003): 253.
85. Metin Heper and Aylin Güney, "The Military and the Consolidation of Democracy: The Recent Turkish Experience," *Armed Forces & Society* 26, no. 4 (Summer 2000): 642.
86. To put it differently, according to the typology of military regimes drawn by Norlindger (see note 43), the Turkish military fluctuated between *moderator (veto) regimes*, where the military exercises a veto power over the government (by staging a "displacement coup") to preserve the status quo and balance of power, and the *guardian regime*, where the military takes over political power, without the intention of exercising it indefinitely, to displace "corrupt" politicians. The *ruler type* of military regime, which is more determined to exercise a greater degree of political control for an extended period and with the ultimate aim of changing significant aspects of the sociopolitical and economic system, could not find much resonance among the Turkish military cadres.
87. One exception could be the period of 1987 to 1993, when military authority was seriously challenged by Prime Minister Özal.
88. Commission of the European Communities, *1998 Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey's Progress towards Accession* (Brussels: Author, November 1998), 14; also available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_11_98/pdf/en/turkey_en.pdf.
89. Ali Resul Usul, "International Dimension of Democratization? The Influence of the European Union on the Consolidation of Democracy in Turkey 1987-2002" (Unpublished Ph.D. diss., Bilkent University, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, May 2003), iii.
90. Füsün Türkmen, "The Military Establishment in Turkey: A Historical Overview of Its Socio-political Role" (Unpublished paper presented at the 2001 IUS Conference), 29.
91. See http://www.bianet.org/2004/09/01_eng/news40974.htm.
92. "Tabularan Yıkartz!" ["We shall destroy taboos"], *Milliyet* [Istanbul Daily], August 5, 2001.
93. The military's objections mainly related to the sympathetic hearing that the PKK often enjoyed in some EU countries.

94. See <http://www.csis.org/turkey/TU/TU041018.pdf>.

95. Ümit Cizre Sakallıoğlu, "The Military and Politics," 200. For a recent account of the impact of the European Union on Turkish civil-military relations, see Aylin Güney and Petek Karatekelioğlu, "Turkey's EU Candidacy and Civil-Military Relations: Challenges and Prospects," *Armed Forces & Society* 31, no. 3 (Spring 2005): 439-62; and Metin Heper, "The European Union, the Turkish Military and Democracy," *South European Society & Politics* 10, no. 1 (April 2005): 33-44.

Özkan Duman received his Master's from the London School of Economics and Political Science. He is currently a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science, Bilkent University, Turkey, where he is writing his dissertation on the role of the European Union (EU) accession process in consolidating the fragile democracies. His areas of interest are Turkey-EU relations, Europeanization, democratization, central and eastern Europe, and Greek and Turkish politics. *E-mail:* ozkand@bilkent.

Dimitris Tsarouhas received his Ph.D. from the University of Sheffield, United Kingdom, where he is currently a tutor at the Department of Politics. His areas of interest are ideological change and political discourses, European labor and social policies, and Greek political history from a comparative perspective. *Address for correspondence:* Dimitris Tsarouhas, University of Sheffield, Department of Politics, Northumberland Rd., Sheffield, United Kingdom; e-mail: D.Tsarouhas@sheffield.ac.uk.